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ABSTRACT
In this thesis, we study the problem of characterizing the set of games that are
consistent with observed equilibrium play, a fundamental problem in econo-
metrics. Our contribution is to develop and analyze a new methodology based
on convex optimization to address this problem, for many classes of games
and observation models of interest. Our approach provides a sharp, compu-
tationally efficient characterization of the extent to which a particular set of
observations constrains the space of games that could have generated them.
This allows us to solve a number of variants of this problem as well as to
quantify the power of games from particular classes (e.g., zero-sum, potential,
linearly parameterized) to explain player behavior.
We illustrate our approach with numerical simulations.
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1C h a p t e r 1
INTRODUCTION
In this thesis, we study the problem of recovering properties and characterizing
payoffs of the games that are consistent with observed play. There are several
reasons why one might want to extrapolate beyond observations of player be-
havior. Finding compatible game payoff matrices that explain observed behav-
ior well (say, assuming observed behavior was generated by equilibrium play
under perturbations of an underlying game) provides compact, interpretable
summaries of said behavior. The process of characterizing consistent pay-
off matrices also yields insight into how tightly the observed player behavior
constrains the space of possible explanatory games—are there multiple, wildly
differing possible explanations for the observed behavior? In some settings, it
may be the case that the observations tightly constrain the set of consistent
games, in which case they may also yield predictive power; an observer who
understands the payoff matrix of a game may be able to predict how player be-
havior will change under modifications to the underlying game, and may also
be better able to manipulate game outcomes. Even when the observations do
not tightly constrain the space of explanatory games, one may wish to verify
whether the observed behavior is consistent with certain assumptions—could
the observed behavior have been generated by a zero-sum game? A potential
game? By other models?
These questions are solidly within the domain of econometrics, an area that
largely focuses on the identification (i.e., parameter-fitting) of simple mod-
els given observational data (data not generated by controlled experiments).
Many econometric approaches to these questions have suffered from at least
one of two main issues:
• Inability to scale to reasonably sized problems due to computational inef-
ficiency. Many of the techniques developed in the econometric literature
are only applicable in practice to games of small size (a prime example
of games that the econometrics literature focuses on are 2-player entry
games, where each of the two players has only two possible actions) or
games with a low-dimensional parameterization.
2• Restrictive assumptions on the observation model and the games to be
fit. In particular, much of the econometrics literature relies on perfectly
knowing the distribution of unobserved variables affecting the games an
observer wants to recover.
In contrast with previous work, our approach is to cast the task of characteriz-
ing and understanding games consistent with player behavior as an efficiently
solvable optimization problem, where observations of equilibrium play act as
constraints on the space of possible explanatory games. This approach allows
us to sidestep issues of model selection (we need not decide which aspects of
the data to include in a model). We do so under assumptions that are weaker
and more robust than the usual econometric assumptions, reflecting ideas from
the robust optimization literature—see [9, 11, 7].
Our approach may be viewed as complementary to a model-driven approach,
in that the tools we provide here may be used to objectively evaluate the
quality of fit one achieves under certain modeling assumptions. Our approach
also allows us to explore a variety of assumptions about the information that
might available to an observer of game play, and the effect that it would have
on constraining the space of consistent games.
1.1 Summary of results
We study a setting in which, at each timestep, an observer observes the equi-
librium selected by the players in a finite, two-player game.1
We assume that players play according to some correlated equilibrium (a more
permissive concept than Nash equilibria). We never make distributional
assumptions on the payoff shifters unlike previous work, nor make any
assumption how the players decide which equilibrium to play when multiple
equilibria are present. Instead, we assume that the observer knows noth-
ing of the equilibrium selection rule, and that the information the observer
has on the unobserved payoff shifters is simply that the unobserved pay-
off shifters belong to a known set (see Section 2 for more details); this
is a significantly weaker assumption than knowing exactly what distribution
the shifters/perturbations are taken from. For example, imagine an analyst
observes a routing game everyday; the shifts in payoff may come from a com-
1Our framework extends to multi-player games with succinct representations; for clarity,
we focus here on the two-player case.
3bination of several events such as changes in road conditions, traffic accidents,
and work zones, whose potential effects on the costs of paths in a routing
game may be difficult to predict and quantify precisely as a single probability
distribution.
In this setting, we give a computationally efficient characterization of
the set of games that are consistent with the observations (Sec-
tion 3.1); this set is “sharp”, in the sense that it does not contain any game
that is not consistent with the observations. One of our main new contribu-
tions is computational efficiency itself: the seminal econometric work of
Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari [10] only checks membership of a game
to the set of consistent games, and does so in a manner that is tractable in
small games but intractable for larger games—see Section 1.2 for a more in-
depth discussion. We show our framework also accommodates an alternate
model wherein the observer learns the expected payoff of each player at each
equilibrium he sees; in our routing game example, think of an observer who
sees the expected time each player spends in traffic. We refer to this setting
as “partial payoff information,” and discuss it in Sections 3 and 4.
Our second main contributions is our ability to quantify the size of the set
of consistent games. We give an efficient algorithm (see Section 3.3, Al-
gorithm 1) that takes a set of observations as input and computes the di-
ameter of the sharp region of consistent games. The diameter of the
consistent set is of interest to an observer, because i) it gives him a measure of
how sharp the conclusions he can draw from the observations are (the larger
the diameter, the least sharp the conclusions), and ii) it tells him whether
approximately accurate recovery of the underlying game is possible (whenever
the diameter is small), when the observer is interested in such point iden-
tification. Additionally, in Section 4, Lemmas 2 and 3, we give structural
conditions on the sets of observations that allow for accurate recov-
ery when payoff information is present. We also exhibit examples in which
said conditions do not hold, and accurate recovery is not possible.
We show we can extend our framework (Section 3.3) to find the set of con-
sistent games when restricted to games with certain linear proper-
ties, e.g., zero-sum games, potential games, and games whose utilities can
be parametrized by linear functions; this allows us to determine to what
extent the observed behavior is consistent with assumptions on the
4underlying game.
In a more basic model in which the payoffs and “shifters” are not observed, and
no additional properties of the underlying game are assumed, the all-constant
game always provides a good explanation for the observed behavior. How-
ever, one presumably wishes to explore the set of nontrivial consistent
games. We provide a framework (Section 5) that eliminates trivial games by
controlling the level of degeneracy of the explanations, and provide bounds on
the trade-off between finding less-trivial games and recovering games that are
more consistent with the observations.
In Section 6, we show we can extend our framework to finite games with larger
number of players, provided they have succinct representation. We further
show our framework’s potential to deal with games with infinite action spaces,
using Cournot competition as an example.
Finally, in Section 7, we illustrate our approach with simple simulations. We
look at what the consistent region looks like for a simple entry game in Sec-
tion 7.1, then look at large Cournot competition in 7.2.
1.2 Related work
An important thread of economics takes an empirical perspective, with the
goal of understanding what properties of agents are consistent with given,
observed data on their economic behavior. While part of this literature focuses
on discrete choice in single-agent problems, another significant line of research
aims to rationalize the behavior of several agents in game theoretic settings,
where their decisions impact each other, as we study here.
Much of the literature on econometrics, whether it be in the single-agent or
game theoretic setting, assumes a parametrized model of agent behavior and
focuses on drawing inferences on the values of the parameters, based on ob-
served behavior. A typical goal is “point identification,” namely, perfectly
recovering the parameters that produced the observed behavior. This line
of work usually relies on distributional assumptions—for example, it assumes
that perturbations added to the parametrized models are drawn from a distri-
bution that is perfectly known by the observer—and aims at identification or
statistical estimation of the underlying parameters (see [23, 21, 30, 18] for an
overview of the fundamentals of econometrics). In econometrics in games, it is
often the case that one requires that the game be small or that the utilities of
5the players can be written as simple functions of a restricted number of param-
eters. For example, 2-player entry games with entry payoffs parametrized as
linear functions of a small number of variables, as seen in [29] and subsequent
work, are among the most studied in the literature. One drawback of this
literature is that when the space of parameters is high-dimensional or when
multiple equilibria exist (which is typically the case in many games of inter-
est), point identification of the true parameters of the game often becomes
impossible, since the observations do not correspond to a unique consistent
explanatory game.
In an interesting departure from the emphasis on point identification, a num-
ber of recent papers [1, 17, 10, 25] consider the problem of constructing regions
of parameters that contain the true value of the parameters they aim to recover
from equilibrium observations of games. For example, Nekipelov, Syrgkanis,
and Tardos [25] study a dynamic sponsored search auction game, and provide a
characterization of the rationalizable set, consisting of the set of private param-
eters that are consistent with the observations, under the relaxed assumption
that players need not follow equilibrium play, but rather use some form of
no-regret learning. Relatedly, Andrews, Berry, and Jia [1] and Ciliberto and
Tamer [17] compute confidence regions for the value of the true parameter, but
their regions are not “sharp,” in the sense that they may contain parameter
values that are not consistent with some of the implications of their models.
Perhaps closest to the present work, Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari [10]
combine random set theory and convex optimization to give a representation of
the sharp identification region—the collection of parameter values that could
generate the distribution of observations found in the data, and only those
parameter values—as the set of values for which the solution to a convex
optimization program with a random objective function is almost surely (in
the observed and unobserved payoff shifters) equal to 0.2 Hence, verifying
membership of a parameter value to the sharp identification region can be done
efficiently in simple settings such as entry-games with linearly parametrized
payoffs. This is an exciting advance; however, for computational reasons, the
approach is impractical in large games, such as 2-player games with many
actions per player:
2Our notion of the consistent set is closely analogous to the sharp identification region
of [10]. We use different terminology to highlight that they are derived under somewhat
different settings.
6• While their framework can verify that a vector of parameter values be-
longs to the sharp identification set, it does not provide an efficient,
searchable representation of the sharp identification set itself.
• One can verify that a parameter vector belongs to the sharp identifica-
tion set by checking that a condition on the objective value of a convex
program holds for almost all possible realizations of the payoff shifters.
Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari [10] further show that one can
cluster payoff shifters into groups such that all perturbed games in the
same group have the same set of Nash equilibria; one then must solve
only one optimization program per group. In particular, in their entry-
game example, the number of such groups is small, and thus this is a
computationally tractable task. However, in more complex games, the
number of such groups can be exponential in the number of actions avail-
able to each player, making this technique impractical when the number
of actions grows.
• Finally, their framework relies on being able to compute all equilibria
of each of the perturbed games. However, no algorithm is known that
can find a Nash equilibrium in time polynomial in the number of actions
of each player, even for general 2-player games—it is in fact a PPAD-
complete problem [16].
The goal of the present thesis is similar to the goal of [10], in the sense that
we wish to sharply understand the set of games that are consistent with a
set of observations (for us, correlated equilibria of perturbed games). We
also use the setting of their simulations as the jumping off point for our own
experimental section. Our work differs from theirs in two main ways. First, the
model of [10] requires strong distributional assumptions on the perturbations;
we relax this by instead assuming only that the perturbations belong to a
known set. Most importantly, we provide a computationally efficient—in
the number of actions available to the players—characterization of the sharp
set of consistent games. Our characterization comes in the form of a convex
set defined by a quadratic (in the number of actions) number of linear and
convex quadratic constraints of a quadratic number of variables; such sets have
been extensively studied in convex optimization, and computationally efficient
algorithms are known for finding elements in and for optimizing over such sets
7(see Boyd and Vandenberghe [14] for a textbook treatment). We also provide
computationally efficient algorithms to find points in the set, quantify the set’s
diameter, and check whether it contains games with certain properties. Our
set-based approach to modeling the perturbations is inspired by the concept
of uncertainty sets in robust optimization (see [9, 11, 7]). Robust optimization
aims to give an alternative to distributional assumptions and avoid their most
common drawbacks: stochastic formulations typically lead to computationally
hard problems, and the guarantees of such stochastic models can sometimes be
severely affected by even minor imprecision in the distributional assumptions
they rely on.
In both the single-agent discrete choice and the multi-agent game theory set-
tings, one important modeling issue is whether and why one would ever observe
multiple, differing behaviors of a single agent. A common approach is to as-
sume that the agents’ behaviors are observed in several different perturbed
versions of the same game. A natural, well-established approach models dif-
ferent observations found in the data as stemming from random perturbations
to the agents’ utilities, as in [13, 15, 29, 28, 4, 5]. In dynamic panel models,
one observes equilibria across several markets sharing common underlying pa-
rameters, and in particular [22] considers a setting in which a unique, fixed
equilibrium is played within each market. We adopt a similar approach here,
and assume that we have access to several markets or locations that play per-
turbed versions of the same game, and that a single (mixed) equilibrium is
played in each location.
It is common (see [4, 2, 10, 6, 3], for example) to assume that the payoff pertur-
bations and covariates have an observable part (known as a payoff shifter) that
is seen by the observer—usually observable economic parameters like costs or
taxes—and a non-observable part. The observed data can be used to estimate
the probabilities of different strategy profiles, conditioned on the observed pay-
off shifters. We demonstrate how a version of such payoff shifter information
can be incorporated into our approach.
A few papers in the computer science literature have looked at slightly different
but related questions, arising when observing equilibria of games whose payoffs
are unknown. In particular, Bhaskar et al. [12] and Rogers et al. [27] study
a network routing setting in which equilibrium behavior can be observed but
edge costs are unknown, and study the query complexity of devising a variant
8of the game to induce desired target flows as equilibria. Barman et al. [8] adopt
a model in which the observer observes what joint strategies are played when
restricting the actions of the players in a complete information game with no
perturbations, and show that data with certain properties can be rationalized
by games with low complexity.
9C h a p t e r 2
MODEL AND SETTING
2.1 Players’ behavior
Consider a finite two-player game G; we will refer to it as the true or underlying
game. Let A1,A2 be the finite sets of actions available to players 1 and 2,
respectively, and let m1 = |A1| and m2 = |A2| be the number of actions
available to them. For every (i, j) ∈ A1 × A2, we denote by Gp(i, j) the
payoff of player p when player 1 chooses action i and player 2 chooses action
j. Gp ∈ Rm1×m2 is the vector representation of the utility of player p, and we
often abuse notation and write G = (G1, G2). The strategies available to player
p are simply the distributions over Ap. A strategy profile is a pair of strategies
(distributions over actions), one for each player. A joint strategy profile is a
distribution over pairs of actions (one for each player); it is not required to be
a product distribution. We refer to strategies as pure when they place their
entire probability mass on a single action, and mixed otherwise.
We consider l perturbed versions of the game G, indexed by k ∈ [l] so that the
kth perturbed game is denoted Gk; one can for instance imagine each Gk as a
version of the game G played in a different location or market k. The same
notation as for G applies to the Gk’s.
Throughout the thesis, we assume that for each k, the players’ strategies are
given by a correlated equilibrium of the complete information game Gk. In the
presence of several such equilibria, no assumption is made on the selection rule
the players use to pick which equilibrium to play (though we assume they both
play according to the same equilibrium). Correlated equilibria are defined as
follows:
Definition 1. A probability distribution e is a correlated equilibrium of game
G = (G1, G2) if and only if
m2∑
j=1
G1(i, j)eij ≥
m2∑
j=1
G1(i
′, j)eij ∀i, i′ ∈ A1
m1∑
i=1
G2(i, j)eij ≥
m1∑
i=1
G2(i, j
′)eij ∀j, j′ ∈ A2
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The notion of correlated equilibrium extends the classical notion of Nash equi-
librium by allowing players to act jointly; as every Nash equilibrium of a game
is a correlated equilibrium of the same game, many of our results also have
implications for Nash equilibria.
2.2 Observation model
We make the important assumption throughout that the observer does
not have access to the payoffs of the underlying game G nor of the
perturbed games Gk, for any k in [l]. We model an observer as observing,
for each perturbed game Gk, the entire correlatd equilibrium distribution ek ∈
Rm1×m2 , where ek(i, j) denotes the joint probability in the kth perturbed game
of player 1 playing action i ∈ A1 while player 2 plays action j ∈ A2. Note
that as ek represents a probability distribution, we require ek(i, j) ≥ 0 ∀(i, j)
and
∑
i,j
ekij = 1.
1 In this thesis, we consider two variants of the model of
observations we just described:
• In the partial payoff information setting, the observer has access to equi-
librium observations e1, ..., el, and additionally to the expected payoff of
equilibrium ek on perturbed games Gk, for each players p and for all
k ∈ [l]; we denote said payoff vkp and note that vkp = ek ′Gkp.
• In the payoff shifter information setting, at each step k, a payoff shifter
βk = (βk1 , β
k
2 ) ∈ Rm1×m2 × Rm1×m2 is added to game G = (G1, G2),
and the perturbed games Gk result from the further addition of small
perturbations to the G+βk’s. The observer knows β1, ..., βl and observes
e1, ..., el of perturbed gamesG1, ..., Gl. This setting is based on a common
model in the economics literature: it represents a situation in which
changes in the behavior of agents are observed as a function of changes
in observable economic parameters (taxes, etc.).
1The reader may interpret this assumption as describing a situation in which each per-
turbed game is played repeatedly over time, with the same (possibly mixed) equilibrium
played each time, allowing the observer to infer the probability distribution over actions
that is followed by the players. When using samples to compute the empirical distribution
over actions followed by the players, one may not have access to exactly the correlated equi-
librium, but instead a nearby distribution that is known to be a ε-approximate equilibrium
for some ε that depends on the sample size. Our framework can trivially be extended to
deal with approximate correlated equilibria.
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While the payoff shifter information setting is the model of perturbations that
is commonly used in econometrics, the partial payoff information setting has
not been used in previous work to the best of our knowledge. We introduce it to
model the following type of situation: two firms are competing for customers in
Los Angeles, and an observer follows what actions the two L.A. branches take
over the course of a quarter. At the end of each quarter, the observer learns
the gross revenue of both firms over the course of the term (or, less plausibly,
their expected payoff, if they have played a mixed equilibrium during that
quarter). Alternatively, agents are playing a routing game, and the observer
gets to see the expected time they spend in traffic.
2.3 Observer’s knowledge about the perturbations
This thesis aims to characterize the games that explain equilibrium observa-
tions under the partial payoff and payoff shifter information settings when
the perturbations are known to be “small” and the perturbed games are thus
“close” to the underlying game. The next few definitions formalize our notion
of closeness, and Assumption 1 formalizes the information the observer has on
the perturbations added to the underlying game G.
Definition 2. A game G is δ-close to games G1, ..., Gl with respect to metric
d for δ > 0 if and only if d(G1, ..., Gl|G) ≤ δ.
We think of d as distances and therefore convex functions of the perturbations
G−Gk for all k. For the above definitions to make sense in the context of this
thesis, we need a metric whose value on a set of games G,G1, ..., Gl is small
when G,G1, ..., Gl are close in terms of payoffs. We consider the following
metrics:
Definition 3. The sum-of-squares distance between games G and G1, ..., Gl is
given by
d2(G
1, ..., Gl|G) =
l∑
k=1
(G1 −Gk1)′(G1 −Gk1) +
l∑
k=1
(G2 −Gk2)′(G2 −Gk2).
The maximum distance between vectors G and G1, ..., Gl is defined as
d∞(G1, ..., Gl|G) = max
p∈{1,2}, k∈[l]
‖Gp −Gkp‖∞
, where ‖.‖∞ denotes the usual infinity norm.
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Both distances are useful, in different situations. The sum-of-squares distance
is small when the variance of the perturbations added to G is known to be
small, but allows for worst-case perturbations to be large. An example is when
the Gk’s are randomly sampled from a distribution with mean G, unbounded
support, and small covariance matrix, in which case some of the perturbations
may deviate significantly from the mean but with low probability, while the
average squared perturbation remains small. If the distribution of perturba-
tions is i.i.d Gaussian, the sum-of-squares norm replicates the log-likelihood of
the estimations and follows a Chi-square distribution. The maximum distance
is small when it is known that all perturbations are small and bounded; one
example is when the perturbations are uniform in a small interval [−δ, δ].
Throughout this thesis, we make the following assumption on the information
about the perturbations that is available to the observer:
Assumption 1. Let G be the underlying game and G1, ..., Gl be its perturba-
tions that generated observations e1, ...el.
• In the partial payoff information settings, the observer knows that G is
δ-close to games G1, ..., Gl with respect to some metric d and magnitude
δ ≥ 0.
• In the payoff shifter information setting with observed shifters β1, ..., βl,
the observer knows that G is δ-close to the unshifted games G1−β1, ..., Gl−
βl with respect to some metric d and magnitude δ ≥ 0.
Assumption 1 defines a convex set the observer knows the perturbations must
belong to, much like the uncertainty sets given in [7, 9, 11]. We note that
the d2 and d∞ distances we focus on define respectively an ellipsoidal and a
polyhedral uncertainty set (as seen in [11]).
Remark 1. While we make Assumption 1 for convenience and simplicity of
exposition, our framework is able to handle more general sets of perturbations.
In particular, the results of Section 3 can easily be extended to any convex
set of perturbations that has an efficient, easy-to-optimize-on representation.
This includes classes of sets defined by a tractable number of linear or convex
quadratic constraints, which in turn encompasses many of the uncertainty sets
considered in [7], such as the central limit theorem or correlation information
sets, and most of the typical sets presented therein.
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2.4 Consistent games
In this thesis, as in [10], we adopt an observation-driven view that describes
the class of games that are consistent with the observed behavior. Given a set
of observations, we define the set of consistent games as follows:
Definition 4 (δ-consistency). We say a game G˜ is δ-consistent with the ob-
servations when there exists a set of games (G˜, G˜1, ..., G˜l) such that for all k,
ek is an equilibrium of G˜k, and:
• If in the partial payoff information model of observations, ∑p G˜k ′p ek = vkp
for all players p and d(G˜1, ..., G˜l|G˜) ≤ δ.
• If in the payoff shifter information model, d(G˜1 − β1, ..., G˜l − βl|G˜) ≤ δ.
The set of all δ-consistent games with respect to metric d is denoted Sd(δ).
Given the specifications of our model, it is often the case that, given a set of
observations with no additional assumption on the distribution of perturba-
tions nor on a the rule used to select among multiple equilibria, one cannot
recover an approximation to a unique game that generated these observations
(no matter what recovery framework is used). That is, the diameter of the
consistent set can sometimes be too large for approximate point identification
to be possible, which is highlighted in the following example:
Example 1. Imagine a simpler setting with no partial payoff or payoff shifter
information, and take any set of observations e1, ..., el and let Gˆ be the all-
constant game, i.e., Gˆ1(i, j) = Gˆ2(i, j) = c for some c ∈ R and for all (i, j) ∈
A1 ×A2. Let Gˆ1 = ... = Gˆl = Gˆ. Then for all k ∈ [l], ek is an equilibrium of
Gˆk, and d2(G
1, ..., Gl|G) = d∞(G1, ..., Gl|G) = 0. That is, Gˆ is a trivial game,
and it is consistent with all possible observations. Even when e1, ..., el are
generated by a non-trivial G, without any additional observations, an observer
cannot determine whether G or Gˆ is the underlying game. In fact, both games
are consistent with all implications of our model. We note that this issue arises
regardless of how inferences will be drawn about the observations, so long as
the approach does not discard consistent games.
It may thus be of interest to an observer to compute the diameter of the
consistent set, either to determine whether point identification is possible,
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or simply to understand how tightly the observations constrain the space of
consistent games. We define it as follows:
Definition 5. The diameter D(Sd(δ)) of consistent set Sd(δ) is given by
D(Sd(δ)) = sup{‖Gˆ− G˜‖+∞ s.t. G˜, Gˆ ∈ Sd(δ)}
When the diameter is small, then every game in the consistent set is close to
the true underlying game, and approximate point identification is achievable.
When the diameter D(Sd(δ)) grows large, point identification is impossible
independently of what framework is used for recovery, as there exists two
games that are D(Sd(δ))-far apart in terms of payoff yet both could have
generated all observations.
15
C h a p t e r 3
A CONVEX OPTIMIZATION FRAMEWORK
In this section, we will see how techniques from convex optimization can be
used to recover the perturbation-minimizing explanation for a set of observa-
tions, determine the extent to which observations are consistent with certain
assumptions on the underlying game, and determine whether a set of observa-
tions tightly constrains the set of games that could explain it well. The results
in this section are not tied to a specific observation model
3.1 Efficient characterization of the set of consistent games
In this section, we show that for every δ, and d ∈ {d2, d+∞}, the set of consis-
tent games Sd(δ) has an efficient, convex representation.
Claim 1. If in the “partial payoff information” model of observations:
Sd(δ) =

G s.t
∃(G1, ..., Gl) with d(G1, ..., Gl|G) ≤ δ s.t.
m2∑
j=1
Gk1(i, j)e
k
ij ≥
m2∑
j=1
Gk1(i
′, j)ekij ∀i, i′ ∈ A1,∀k ∈ [l],
m1∑
i=1
Gk2(i, j)e
k
ij ≥
m1∑
i=1
Gk2(i, j
′)ekij ∀j, j′ ∈ A2,∀k ∈ [l]∑
p G˜
k ′
p e
k = vkp

If in the “payoff shifter information” model:
Sd(δ) =
G s.t
∃(G1, ..., Gl) with d(G˜1 − β1, ..., G˜l − βl|G˜) ≤ δ s.t.
m2∑
j=1
Gk1(i, j)e
k
ij ≥
m2∑
j=1
Gk1(i
′, j)ekij ∀i, i′ ∈ A1, ∀k ∈ [l],
m1∑
i=1
Gk2(i, j)e
k
ij ≥
m1∑
i=1
Gk2(i, j
′)ekij ∀j, j′ ∈ A2, ∀k ∈ [l]

Proof. Follows from the definion of δ-consistency (Definition 4)
We remark that as in [10], our sets are sharp: any game that explains the
observations belongs to this set, and any game that belongs to this set is
consistent with our assumptions and observations. Indeed, if G is in the con-
sistent set, there must exist perturbations of valid magnitude (given by the
corresponding G1, ..., Gl) and an equilibrium ek of each perturbed game that
together lead to our observations, by the definition of the consistent set.
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These consistent sets have efficient convex representations, for two reasons.
First, all constraints are always linear except those of the form
d(G1p, ..., G
l
p|G) ≤ δ. When d = d2, d(G1p, ..., Glp|G) ≤ δ is a simple convex
quadratic constraint, while when d = d∞, d(G1p, ..., G
l
p|G) ≤ δ is equivalent to
the following collection of linear constraints:
−δ ≤ Gkp −Gp ∀p ∈ {1, 2},∀k ∈ [l]
Gkp −Gp ≤ δ ∀p ∈ {1, 2},∀k ∈ [l].
Second, the number of constraints describing each set is quadratic in the num-
ber of player actions m1 and m2.
As mentioned in the model and setting section, it is easy to see that in all
observation models d(G1p, ..., G
l
p|G) ≤ δ can easily be replaced by the pertur-
bations Gk −G being in any tractable convex set. In particular, many of the
sets considered in [7] fit this requirement, and they describe robust informa-
tion that an observer without distributional knowledge of the perturbations
could realistically have on said perturbations: for example, an observer could
know that the sum or average of the perturbations satisfies certain lower- and
upper-bounds.
3.2 Recovering the perturbation-minimizing consistent game
Here, we consider the problem of recovering a game that best explains a given
set of observations from perturbed games, according to the desired distance
metric d. One reason to do so is that it enables an observer to test whether
there exists any game in Sd(δ) that is consistent with specific properties and
to give a measure of how much of Sd(δ) has said properties—see Section 3.3.
Or, it could be that the observer is simply interested in recovering the “best”
game according to any simple convex metric of interest. For any metric d and
any observation model, this can be done simply by solving:
min
G,δ
δ
s.t. G ∈ Sd(δ)
(3.1)
It is easy to see that this program returns the game G and the minimum value
of δ such that d(G1, ..., Gl|G) ≤ δ (resp. d(G1 − S1, ..., Gl − Sl|G) ≤ δ) in the
partial payoff information setting (resp. the payoff shifter information setting)
where the Gk’s satisfy all equilibrium constraints, hence Program (3.1) returns
the perturbation-minimizing G that is consistent with all observations. When
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d = d∞, this is a linear program and when d = d2, this is a second-order cone
program, using the same reasoning as in Section 3.1 – this clearly holds even
with δ as a variable. Both types of programs can be solved efficiently, as seen
in [14]
3.3 Can observations be explained by linear properties?
This convex optimization-based approach can be used to determine whether
there exists a game that is compatible with the observations and that also
has certain additional properties, as long as these properties can be expressed
as a tractable number of linear equalities and inequalities. One can then
solve program (3.1) with said linear equalities and inequalities as additional
constraints (the program remains a SOCP or LP with a tractable number of
constraints), then check whether the optimal value is greater than or less than
δ. If the optimal value is greater than δ, then there exists no game with those
properties that belongs to the δ-consistent set; if the optimal value is smaller
than δ, then the recovered game obeys the additional properties and belongs to
the δ-consistent set. In what follows, we present a few examples of interesting
properties that fit this framework.
Zero-sum games
A zero-sum game is a game in which for each pure strategy (i, j), the sum of
the payoff of player 1 and the payoff of player 2 for (i, j) is always 0. One can
restrict the set of games we look for to be zero-sum games, at the cost of sepa-
rability of Program (3.1), by adding constraints G1(i, j) = −G2(i, j) ∀(i, j) ∈
A1 ×A2.
Exact potential games
A 2-player game G is an exact potential game if and only if it admits an exact
potential function, i.e. a function Φ that satisfies:
Φ(i, j)− Φ(i′, j) = G1(i, j)−G1(i′, j) ∀i, i′ ∈ A1,∀j ∈ A2 (3.2)
Φ(i, j)− Φ(i, j′) = G2(i, j)−G2(i, j′) ∀i ∈ A1,∀j, j′ ∈ A2 (3.3)
In order to restrict the set of games we are searching over to the set of potential
games, one can introduce m1m2 variables Φ(i, j) and constraints (3.2), (3.3)
in Program (3.1).
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Games generated through linear parameter fitting
It is common in the economics literature to recover a game with the help
of a parametrized function whose parameters are calibrated using the ob-
servations. In many applications, linear functions of some parameters are
considered—entry games are one example. Our framework allows one to de-
termine whether there exist parameters for such a linear function that provide
good explanation for the observations. When such parameters exist, one can
use the mathematical program to find a set of parameters that describe a game
which is consistent with the observations. Take two functions f1(θ) and f2(θ)
that are linear in the vector of parameters θ and output a vector in Rm1×m2 .
It suffices to add the the optimization variable θ and the linear constraints
G1 = f1(θ) and G2 = f2(θ) to Program (3.1) to restrict the set of games we
look for to games linearly parametrized by f1, f2.
Computing the diameter of the consistent set
In this section, we provide an algorithm for computing the diameter of Sd(δ)
for a given value of δ, Algorithm 1.
ALGORITHM 1: Computing the diameter of the consistent set
Input: Observations e1, ..., el, magnitude of perturbations δ, metric d
Output: Real number A(δ), can be infinite
for (i, j) ∈ A1 ×A2, player p ∈ 1, 2 do
Pδ,p(i, j) = sup
G˜,Gˆ,γ
γ
s.t. G˜ ∈ Sd(δ)
Gˆ ∈ Sd(δ)
G˜1(i, j)− Gˆ1(i, j) ≥ γ
end
A(δ) = max
(i,j)∈A1×A2
max
p∈{1,2}
Pδ,p(i, j)
Algorithm 1 is computationally efficient for the considered metrics d2 and
d∞: it solves 2m1m2 linear programs for d∞, and 2m1m2 second-order cone
programs (SOCP) for d = d2 with a tractable number of constraints. The
algorithm has the following property:
Lemma 1. The output A(δ) of Algorithm 1 run with input δ satisfies A(δ) =
D(Sd(δ)).
Proof. See Appendix A.
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Thus Algorithm 1 computes exactly the diameter of Sd(δ) for any parameter δ.
Because the diameter is a property of the consistent set and not of the frame-
work used to recover an element from said set, this tells an observer whether
approximate point identification is possible independently of what framework
is used for recovery. In particular, when the diameter is small, our framework
approximately recovers the true underlying game (see Section 3.2). When the
diameter is big, no framework can achieve approximate point identification of
a true, underlying game.
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C h a p t e r 4
CONSISTENT GAMES WITH PARTIAL PAYOFF
INFORMATION: WHEN IS RECOVERY POSSIBLE?
This section considers the partial payoff information variant of the observation
model described in Section 2. We ask the following question: when is it
possible to approximate the underlying game, in the presence of partial payoff
information? We answer this question by giving bounds on the diameter of
the consistent set Sd(δ) as a function of δ and the observations e
1, ..., el, for
both metrics d2 and d∞.
Recall that in this setting, for an equilibrium ek observed from perturbed game
Gk, the observer also learns the expected payoff vkp of player p in said equilib-
rium strategy on game Gk, in addition to observing ek. Similar to the previous
sections, we are interested in computing a game Gˆ that is close to some per-
turbed games Gˆ1, ..., Gˆl that (respectively) have equilibria e1, ..., el with payoffs
v1, ..., vl. For simplicity of presentation, we recall that the optimization pro-
gram that the observer solves is separable and note that he can thus solve the
following convex optimization problem for player 1, and a similar optimization
problem for player 2
P ()= min
Gk1 ,G1
d(G11, ..., G
k
1|G1)
s.t.
d∑
j=1
Gk1(i, j)e
k
ij ≥
d∑
j=1
Gk1(i
′, j)ekij ∀i, i′ ∈ A1,∀j ∈ A2, ∀k ∈ [l]
ek ′Gk1 = v
k
1 ∀k ∈ [l]
(4.1)
We take l ≥ m1m2 and make the following assumption for the remainder of
this subsection, unless otherwise specified:
Assumption 2. There exists a subset E ⊂ {e1, ..., el} of size m1m2 such that
the vectors in E are linearly independent.
We abuse notation and denote by E the m1m2 × m1m2 matrix in which
row i is given by the ith element of set E, for all i ∈ [m1m2]; also, we
write d(G1, ..., Gl|G) = ∑
p
d(G1p, ..., G
l
p|Gp), i.e. d(G1p, ..., Glp|Gp) is the part
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of d(G1, ..., Gl|G) that corresponds to player p. For every p ∈ N ∪ {+∞}, let
‖.‖p be the p-norm. We can define the corresponding induced matrix norm
‖.‖p that satisfies ‖M‖p = sup
x 6=0
‖Mx‖p
‖x‖p for any matrix M ∈ Rm1m2×m1m2 .
The following statement highlights that if one has m1m2 linearly independent
observations (among the l equilibrium observations) such that the induced
matrix of observations E is well-conditioned, and the perturbed games are
obtained from the underlying game through small perturbations, any optimal
solution of Program (4.1) necessarily recovers a game whose payoffs are close
to the payoffs of the underlying game. The statements are given for both
metrics introduced in Section 2.
Lemma 2. Let G be the underlying game, and G1, ..., Gl be the games gen-
erating observations e1, .., el, where l = m1m2. Suppose that for player p,
d2(G
1
p, ..., G
l
p|Gp) ≤ δ. Let (Gˆp, Gˆ1p, ..., Gˆlp) be an optimal solution of Program
(4.1) for player p with distance function d2. Then
‖Gp − Gˆp‖2 ≤
√
2‖E−1‖2 · δ.
Proof. For simplicity of notation, we drop the p indices. We first remark that
(G,G1, ..., Gl) is feasible for Program (4.1); as (Gˆ, Gˆ1, ..., Gˆl) is optimal, it is
necessarily the case that
l∑
k=1
‖Gˆ− Gˆk‖22 ≤
l∑
k=1
‖G−Gk‖22 ≤ δ.
Let us write ∆G = G− Gˆ. We know that for all k, ek ′Gk = ek ′Gˆk = vk, and
thus ek ′(Gk − Gˆk) = 0. We can write
E∆G = (e′1(G− Gˆ) ... e′l(G− Gˆ))′
= (e′1(G−G1 +G1 − Gˆ1 + Gˆ1 − Gˆ) ... e′l(G−Gl +Gl − Gˆl + Gˆl − Gˆ))′
= (e′1(G−G1 + Gˆ1 − Gˆ) ... e′l(G−Gl + Gˆl − Gˆ))′.
Let xk = G−Gk + Gˆk − Gˆ. We then have ‖E∆G‖22 =
l∑
k=1
x′keke
′
kxk, as eke
′
k is
a symmetric, positive semi-definite, stochastic matrix, all its eigenvalues are
between 0 and 1 and
‖E∆G‖22 ≤
l∑
k=1
x′kxk =
l∑
k=1
‖xk‖22 ≤ 2δ.
It immediately follows that ‖∆G‖2 ≤
√
2‖E−1‖2 · δ.
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Lemma 3. Let G be the underlying game, and G1, ..., Gl be the games gen-
erating observations e1, .., el, where l = m1m2. Suppose that for player p,
d∞(G1p, ..., G
l
p|Gp) ≤ δ. Let (Gˆp, Gˆ1p, ..., Gˆlp) be an optimal solution of Pro-
gram (4.1) for player p with distance function d∞. Then
‖Gp − Gˆp‖∞ ≤ 2‖E−1‖∞ · δ.
Proof. See Appendix B.
When E is far from being singular, as long as the perturbations are small, we
can accurately recover the payoff matrix of each player. An extreme example
arises when we take E to be the identity matrix, in which case we observe every
single pure strategy of the game and an approximation of the payoff of each
of these strategies, allowing us to approximately reconstruct the game. It is
also the case that there are examples in which ‖E−1‖∞ is large and there exist
two games that are far from one another, yet both explain the observations,
making our bound essentially tight:
Example 2. Consider the square matrix E ∈ R4×4 with probability 0.25 +
 on the diagonal and 0.75+
3
off the diagonal, i.e., we get four equilibrium
observations with a different action profile that has probability slightly higher
than 0.25 for each equilibrium; the first equilibrium has a higher probability on
action profile (1,1), the second on (1,2), the third on (2,1) and the last one on
(2,2). Suppose the vector of observed payoffs is v = (δ,−δ, δ,−δ)′, where v(i)
is the payoff for the ith equilibrium. Note that there exists a constant C such
that for all  > 0 small enough, ‖E−1‖+∞ ≤ C .
In the rest of the example, we fix the payoff matrix of player 2 for all considered
games to be all zero so that it is consistent with every equilibrium observation,
and describe a game through the payoff matrix of player 1. Let G be the all-
zero game, G1 = G3 be the game with payoff δ
0.5+2/3
on actions (1,1) and
(1,2) and 0 everywhere else, and G2 = G4 be the game with payoff − δ
0.5+2/3
on actions (2,1) and (2,2) and 0 everywhere else. The Gi’s are consistent with
the payoff observations as the payoffs are constant across rows on the same
column, making no deviation profitable, and that the payoff of each equilibrium
is indeed δ. We have
d∞(G1, G2, G3, G4|G) = δ
0.5 + 2/3
≤ 2δ
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and
lim
→0
d∞(G1, G2, G3, G4|G) = 2δ.
Now, take Gˆ to be the game that has payoff δ/ for action profiles (1,1) and
(1,2), and −δ/ for (2,1) and (2,2). Take Gˆ1 = Gˆ3 to be the game with
payoffs δ

in the first column, and − δ

3−2
3−4 in the second column; similarly, take
Gˆ2 = Gˆ4 to be the game with payoffs δ

3−2
3−4 in the first column and − δ in the
second column. The observations are equilibria of the Gˆi’s and yield payoff δ.
Now, note that for  < 3/4,
d∞(G1, G2, G3, G4|G) = δ

∣∣∣∣1− 3− 23− 4
∣∣∣∣ = 23− 4δ
Therefore, both G and Gˆ are good explanations of the equilibrium observations,
in the sense that for  ≤ 1/4, G is δ-close to G1, ..., Gl and Gˆ is δ-close to
Gˆ1, ..., Gˆl that have e1, ..., el as equilibria, respectively. However,
‖G− Gˆ‖∞ = δ

− δ
0.5 + 2/3
≥ δ
(
1

− 2
)
,
which immediately implies
‖G− Gˆ‖∞ = Ω→0
(
δ

)
= Ω→0
(‖E−1‖∞δ) .
Remark 2. In the case of sparse games, in which some action profiles are
never profitable to the players, and are therefore never played, one can reduce
the number of linearly independent, well-conditioned observations needed for
accurate recovery. Under the assumption that the action profiles that are never
played with positive probability have payoffs strictly worse than the lowest pay-
off of any action profile played with non-zero probability, one can solve the
optimization problem on the restricted set of action profiles that are observed
in at least one equilibrium, and set the payoffs of the remaining action profiles
to be lower than the lowest payoff of the recovered subgame, without affecting
the equilibrium structure of the game. While the recovered game may not be
the unique good explanation of the observations when looking at the full payoff
matrix, it is unique with respect to the subgame of non-trivial actions when one
has access to sufficiently many linearly independent, well-conditioned equilib-
rium observations.
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C h a p t e r 5
FINDING CONSISTENT GAMES WITHOUT ADDITIONAL
INFORMATION
This section focuses on a variant of the observation models given in Section 2
in which the observer only observes what equilibrium ek is played for each
perturbed game Gk, and does not have access to payoff shifters nor partial
payoff information. In this section, we note that in the absence of additional
information, the consistent region contains a continuum of trivial and nearly
trivial games that may not be of interest to an observer. Hence, we provide
a framework that allows the observer to avoid recovering trivial games by
controlling the degree of “degeneracy” (i.e., closeness to a trivial game) of
the games he considers. Further, we characterize how much the size of the
consistent set shrinks as a function of the minimum level of degeneracy of the
games the observer is interested in.
5.1 Finding non-degenerate games
In this section, we separate the programs solved for players 1 and 2 and focus
on the optimization problem that recovers the payoffs of player 1 (by symme-
try, all results can be applied to the optimization program that recovers the
payoffs player 2); we drop the player indices for notational simplicity. Since
no payoff information is given, throughout this section, we assume w.l.o.g that
the games are normalized to have all payoffs between 0 and 1. As mentioned in
Example 1, the all-constant game G = G1 = ... = Gl gives an optimal solution
to our optimization problem, as such a game is compatible with all equilibrium
observations and has an objective value d(G1, ..., Gl|G) = 0. It is therefore the
case that solving our optimization problem might output a degenerate game,
so in this section, we provide a framework that allows us to control the degree
of degeneracy of the game we recover and to avoid trivial, all-constant games.
To do so, we require some of the equilibria of the games to be “strict,” in the
sense that
d∑
j=1
G(i, j)xij ≥
d∑
j=1
G(i′, j)xij + εii′ ∀i, i′
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with εii′ ≥ 0 and with the condition that at least one of the εii′ is non-zero. All-
constant games do not have strict equilibria, thus this avoids such games. Note
that such a technique only affect the payoffs of pure strategies that are played
with positive probability, and does not accord any importance to strategies
that are never played. Let us now consider the new problem:
min
Gk,G
d(G1, ..., Gl|G)
s.t. ek is a “strict” equilibrium of Gk, ∀k
0 ≤ G(i, j) ≤ 1, ∀(i, j)
which can be rewritten as
min
Gk,G
d(G1, ..., Gl|G)
s.t.
d∑
j=1
Gk(i, j)ekij =
d∑
j=1
Gk(i′, j)ekij + ε
k
ii′ ∀(i, i′),∀k
0 ≤ G(i, j) ≤ 1, ∀(i, j)
We introduce a positive parameter ε that controls the level of non-degeneracy
of the game and let the optimization program decide how to split ε among the
εkii′ ’s in a way that minimizes the objective. The optimization program can
now be written as
P (ε) = min
Gk,G
d(G1, ..., Gl|G)
s.t.
d∑
j=1
Gk(i, j)ekij =
d∑
j=1
Gk(i′, j)ekij + ε
k
ii′ ∀(i, i′),∀k
l∑
k=1
∑
i,i′
εkii′ = ε
0 ≤ G ≤ 1
εkii′ ≥ 0 ∀(i, i′),∀k
For all i, i′ ∈ A1 such that i 6= i′ and k ∈ [l], we introduce vectors e˜kii′ whose
entries are defined as follows:
e˜kii′(h, j) =

−ek(i, j) if h = i
ek(i, j) if h = i′
0 if h 6= i, i′
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This allows us to rewrite the optimization program under the following form:
P (ε) = min
Gk,G
d(G1, ..., Gl|G)
s.t.
∑
k,i,i′
e˜k ′ii′G
k = −ε
e˜k ′ii′G
k ≤ 0 ∀(i, i′), ∀k
0 ≤ G ≤ 1
(5.1)
This optimization problem is, depending on the chosen metric, either a linear
or quadratic optimization program with a tractable number of constraints, and
can therefore be efficiently solved.
5.2 A duality framework
In this section, we give a duality framework under distance d2 that offers insight
into the solutions to the optimization program. Throughout the section, we
let D(ε) be the dual of Program (5.1).
Sufficient conditions for strong duality
Claim 2. If there exist G1, ..., Gl such that
e˜k ′ii′G
k < 0 ∀(i, i′) ∈ cA1,∀k ∈ [l] s.t. e˜kii′ 6= 0,
then strong duality holds and P (ε) = D(ε).
Proof. Slater’s condition holds iff there exists a solution G,G1, ..., Gl such that∑
k,i,i′
e˜k ′ii′G
k = −ε
e˜k ′ii′G
k < 0 ∀(i, i′),∀k s.t. e˜kii′ 6= 0.
It is enough to find G1, ..., Gl such that
e˜k ′ii′G
k < 0 ∀(i, i′),∀k s.t. e˜kii′ 6= 0
as we can then renormalize the Gk’s such that
l∑
k=1
∑
i,i′
εkii′ = ε.
Note that the previous sufficient condition is not necessarily tractable to check.
We give a stronger sufficient condition such that for any fixed k, e˜k ′ii′G
k <
0 ∀(i, i′) has a solution:
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Lemma 4. Let k ∈ [l]. Let ek(i, :) = (ek(i, 1), ..., (ek(i,m2)) ∀i ∈ A1. If the
non-null ek(1, :), ..., ek(m1, :) are linearly independent, then the non-null e˜
k
ii′’s
are linearly independent. In particular, there exists Gk such that
e˜k ′ii′G
k < 0, ∀i, i′ ∈ A1.
If this holds for all k ∈ [l], then P (ε) = D(ε).
Proof. Let α(h, h′)’s be such that
∑
h,h′
α(h, h′)e˜khh′ = 0, and so
∑
h,h′
α(h, h′)e˜khh′(i, j) =
0 ∀(i, j). Recall that for a fixed (i, j), e˜kh,h′(i,j) 6= 0 only if h = i or h′ = i, but
not both at the same time. Therefore,∑
h,h′
α(h, h′)e˜khh′(i, j) =
∑
h′ 6=i
α(i, h′)e˜ki,h′(i, j) +
∑
h6=i
α(h, i)e˜kh,i′(i, j).
As e˜ki,h′(i, j) = −ek(i, j) and e˜kh,i(i, j) = ek(h, j), we have for all (i, j) that
−ek(i, j)
∑
h′ 6=i
α(i, h′) +
∑
h6=i
α(h, i)ek(h, j) =
∑
h,h′
α(h, h′)e˜khh′(i, j) = 0.
Since this holds for all values of j, it immediately follows that for all i,
−ek(i, :)
∑
h′ 6=i
α(i, h′) +
∑
h6=i
α(h, i)ek(h, :) = 0.
Take any i, i′ such that ekii′ 6= 0. Then ek(i, :) 6= 0 and ek(i′, :) 6= 0. By the
previous equation, we have
−ek(i′, :)
∑
h′ 6=i′
α(i′, h′) + α(i, i′)ek(i, :) +
∑
h6=i,i′
α(h, i′)ek(h, :)
= −ek(i′, :)
∑
h′ 6=i′
α(i′, h′) +
∑
h6=i′
α(h, i′)ek(h, :)
= 0
and by the linear independence assumption, we necessarily have α(i, i′) = 0.
Therefore, the e˜kii′ 6= 0’s are linearly independent, completing the proof.
Note that in the worst case, we want m1 ≤ m2, as there can be up to m1 non-
null ek(i, :) of size m2, and by symmetry, we want m2 ≤ m1 for the program
that recovers the payoffs of player 2. For the remainder of this section, we
require m1 = m2, which can be obtained by adding dummy actions to Ap
of player p with the least available actions. When the condition does not
hold in such a setting, it can be obtained through small perturbations of the
equilibrium observations.
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Dual program
The dual of program (5.1) is given by:
Theorem 1. The dual of optimization problem 5.1 is given by:
D(ε) = max
µk
ii′ ,λ0,λ1
−1
4
∑l
k=1(
∑
i,i′
µkii′ e˜
k
ii′)
′(
∑
i,i′
µkii′ e˜
k
ii′)− 1′λ1 − µε
s.t. λ1 − λ0 +
∑
k,i,i′
µkii′ e˜
k
ii′ = 0
µ+ µkii′ ≥ 0
λ0, λ1 ≥ 0
(5.2)
The KKT conditions imply that if (G1∗, ..., Gl∗, G∗) is a primal optimal solution
and (λ∗0, λ
∗
1, µ
∗, µk ∗ii′ ) is a dual optimal solution, then
∀k,Gk∗ = A− 1
2
(
λ∗1−λ∗0
l
+
∑
i,i′
µk ∗ii′ e˜
k
ii′)
G∗ = A− 1
2l
(λ∗1 − λ∗0)
(5.3)
for some matrix A ∈ Rl×l
Proof. See Appendix D.
This duality framework will allow us to obtain bounds on the trade-off between
degeneracy and accuracy in the next subsection.
5.3 Trade-off between degeneracy and objective value
Definition 6. We define the degeneracy threshold ε∗ of a set of observations
as
ε∗ = sup{ε s.t. P (ε) = 0}.
Claim 3. The degeneracy threshold is given by
ε∗ = −min
G,εk
ii′
∑
k,i,i′
e˜k ′ii′G
s.t. e˜k ′ii′G ≤ 0 ∀(i, i′),∀k
0 ≤ G ≤ 1
(5.4)
The claim gives a tractable linear program to solve for the degeneracy thresh-
old.
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Proof. Remark that ε∗ solves
ε∗ = max
Gk,G,εk
ii′
ε
s.t. e˜k ′ii′G
k + εkii′ = 0 ∀(i, i′), ∀k
l∑
k=1
(Gk −G)′(Gk −G) = 0∑
k,i,i′
εkii′ = ε
εkii′ ≥ 0 ∀(i, i′), ∀k
0 ≤ G ≤ 1
From the fact that
l∑
k=1
(Gk − G)′(Gk − G) = 0 implies G1 = ... = Gl = G, we
have
ε∗ = max
G,εk
ii′
∑
k,i,i′
εkii′
s.t. e˜k ′ii′G+ ε
k
ii′ = 0 ∀(i, i′), ∀k
εkii′ ≥ 0 ∀(i, i′),∀k
0 ≤ G ≤ 1
The result follows immediately.
Claim 4. ε∗ is finite, ∀ε ≤ ε∗, P (ε) = 0, and ∀ε > ε∗, P (ε) > 0.
Proof. The proof follows immediately from Claim 9. P (ε∗) = 0 comes from
the fact that the feasible set of Program (5.4) is bounded: indeed, for any
point in its feasible set, 0 ≤ G ≤ 1 and εkii′ = −e˜k ′ii′G, forcing the εkii′ to also
be bounded. Thus, ε∗ is a solution of a linear program on a bounded polytope
and is therefore finite, and attained at an extreme point of this polytope.
Note that if we solve optimization Program (5.4) and find that ε∗ is large, then
it is possible to find a large value of ε such that P (ε) = 0, and we can therefore
recover a non-degenerate game that has all of the observed equilibria, i.e., we
recover a game that has equilibrium properties similar in some sense to those
of the true, underlying game. For smaller values of ε∗, we refer to the following
statement:
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Theorem 2. For every ε0 > ε
∗, and for all ε ≥ ε0, we have f(ε) ≤ P (ε) ≤
g(ε) where f and g are given by
f(ε) = P (ε0)
ε2
ε20
(5.5)
g(ε) =
(
(
√
P (ε0) +
√
lm
2
)
ε
ε0
−
√
lm
2
)2
(5.6)
Proof. See Appendix E.
An observer that sets a degeneracy parameter of ε restricts himself to a set of
games that must have an empty intersection with Sd(f(ε)) and a non-empty
intersection with the set Sd(g(ε)).
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C h a p t e r 6
EXTENSIONS
In this section, we show how our framework can be extended to on the one
hand succinct games with many players, and on the other hand some games
with infinite action spaces.
6.1 Linear succinct games as per [24]
In general, computational complexity cannot be obtained as the number of
players increase. A reason for this is that in the general case, an intractable,
exponential number (in the number of players) of variables need be used to
represent the game and its equilibria: in a game with n players and m actions
per player, there are mn pure action profiles, hence mn variables are needed
simply to represent the payoff matrix of the payoff matrices and the equilibria
of the recovered games.
However, if the game and the observed equilibria have a compact representa-
tion, the equilibrium constraints can be written down using a tractable number
of variables, and our framework provides efficient algorithms to find an element
in the consistent set, compute its diameter, and test for linear properties. [24]
considers linear succinct games and show that if the structure of the succinct
game is known and if we observe an equilbirium such that the “equilibrium
summation property holds” (roughly, the exact expected utility of the players
can be computed efficiently), then a game is consistent with the equilibrium
observations if and only if a polynomial number of tractable, linear constraints
are satisfied. Such constraints can easily be incorporated into our framework.
See Property 1 and Lemma 1 of [24] for more details.
6.2 Cournot competition and infinite action space
In the general case, our framework cannot directly deal with games with infi-
nite action spaces in a tractable way: to write down an equilibrium constraint,
one needs a constraint for each of the infinite number of possible deviations.
In this section, we show that nevertheless, there exist games with infinite ac-
tion spaces for which only a finite, tractable number of constraints is needed
to characterize the equilibria, and show how to adapt our framework to said
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games. We focus on the Cournot competition game with continuous spaces of
production levels.
Consider a Cournot competition with n players selling the same good. Each
player i chooses a production level qi ≥ 0, and sells all produced goods at price
P (q1, ..., qn) common to all players, and each player i incurs a production cost
ci(qi) to produce qi units of the good; we write G=(P, c) where c = (c1, ..., cn).
We assume that P is concave in each qi.
We assume the observer knows the function P and wants to recover the costs ci
of the players, where the costs are perturbed over time. Formally, consider that
we have l perturbed games such that in every pertubed game k, people play
a Cournot competition with the same, commonly known price function P but
perturbed cost functions cki for each player i, known to be convex. We obtain
equilbrium observations q1, ..., ql, where qki is the equilibrium production level
of player i in perturbed game k and qk = (qk1 , ..., q
k
n). I.e., G
k = (P, ck).
Suppose the following hold:
• The observer knows the costs belong to the space of polynomials of any
chosen fixed degree d ≥ 1; i.e., the observer parameterizes the underlying
and perturbed cost functions the following way:
ci(qi) =
d∑
ex=1
ai(ex)q
ex
i (6.1)
where the ai(ex)’s are now the variables the observer want to recover.
• d(c1, ..., cl|c) ≤ δ can be written as a tractable number of semidefinite
constraints on the aki ’s and ai’s (this include, but is not limited to the
d2 and d∞ distances).
• P (q) and ∂P
∂qi
can be computed efficiently for i, given q.
Then Sd(δ) has an efficiently computable and tractable representation (as a
function of n, l and d) as the intersection of SDP constraints. This means in
particular that optimizing a linear function over Sd(δ) can be easily cast as a
tractable semidefinite program, for which efficient solvers are known – see [14];
one such solver, that we use in the simulations of Section sec: simulations, is
CVX ( [20]). This includes the ability to efficiently recover a game in the
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consistent set, efficiently compute its diameter, and efficiently test for linear
properties (by simply adding linear and thus SDP constraints if needed).
To obtain such a tractable characterization, we only need to note that i) the
equilibrium constraints can be rewritten as a tractable number of tractable
linear constraints and ii)convexity constraints on polynomials can be classically
cast as tractable SDP constraints. This is the object of Appendix C.1 and C.2.
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C h a p t e r 7
SIMULATIONS FOR ENTRY GAMES AND COURNOT
COMPETITION
In this section, we run simulations for two concrete settings to illustrate the
power of our approach. We first illustrate how our framework performs on a
simple entry game in Section 7.1, then show that it is able to handle much
larger games in Section 7.2.
7.1 2-player entry game
We first consider an entry game, in which each of two players (think of them as
companies deciding whether to open a store in a new location) has two actions
available to him (enter the market; don’t enter the market). Entry games are
common in the econometrics literature, as seen in [1, 17, 10], and an easy one
to start with and visualize the consistent region.
Each player p has two actions: Ap = {0, 1}; ap = 0 if player p does not
enter the market, ap = 1 if he does. The utility of a player is given by
Gp(ap, a−p) = ap((1−a−p)γp+a−pθp) for some parameters γp ≥ 0 and θp ≤ γp,
similarly to [29]: if player p does not enter the market, his utility is zero; if
he enters the game but the other player does not, p has a monopoly on the
market and gets non-negative utility; finally, if both players enter the game,
they compete with each other and get less utility than if they had a monopoly.
In our simulations, we fix values for the parameters (γp, θp) and generate the
perturbed games as follows:
• In the partial payoff information settings, we add independent Gaussian
noise with mean 0 and standard deviation σ to Gp(ap = 1, a−p) (we vary
the value of σ) to obtain the perturbed games G1, ..., Gl.
• In the payoff shifter information case, we sample the payoff shifters
β1, ..., βl such that for all k ∈ [l], for all players p, βkp (ap = 1, a−p) follows
a normal distribution of mean 0 and standard deviation σs. We then add
Gaussian noise with mean 0 and standard deviation σ to Gp(ap = 1, a−p)
to obtain the perturbed games G1, ..., Gl.
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In all observation models, paralleling the setting of [10], no observed payoff
shifter nor unknown noise is added to the payoff of action ap = 0 for player p;
action ap = 0 is always assumed to yield payoff 0 for player p, independently
of a−p. In order to generate the equilibrium observations, once the perturbed
games are generated, we find the set of equilibria of each of the Gk, and
sample a point ek in said set. In the payoff information case, we also compute
vk = ek ′Gk.
In order to parallel the setting of Beresteanu et al. [10], we assume the observer
knows the form of the utility function, i.e., that Gp(0, 0) = 0 and Gp(ap =
0, a−p = 1) = 0, and that he aims to recover the values of γp and θp. Thus,
we add linear constraints Gp(0, 0) = 0 and Gp(ap = 0, a−p = 1) = 0 in the
optimization programs that we solve (see Program (3.1)) in the payoff shifter
information and partial payoff information settings. Furthermore, we assume
as in [10] that the observer knows that perturbations are only added to γ and
θ, and therefore we add linear constraints Gkp(0, 0) = 0 and G
k
p(ap = 0, a−p =
1) = 0 for all k ∈ [l] to the optimization problems for player p in each of the
observation models. All optimization problems are solved in Matlab, using
CVX (see [20]).
Our model for entry-games is similar to the ones presented in [29] and used in
simulations in [10], so as to facilitate informal comparisons of the simulation
results of both works; in particular, the parametrization of the utility functions
of the players in our simulations is inspired by [10], and noise is generated
and added in a similar fashion. However, while we attempt to parallel the
simulations run by Beresteanu et al. [10], it is important to note that this is not
an apples-to-apples comparison, because of key differences in the setting. In
particular, our observation models (seeing full equilibria) and the information
available to the observer (no distributional assumptions) are different from
those in [10].
Consistent regions for Player 1
We fix l = 500, γ = 5, θ = −10 in all simulations, and vary the values of σ
and σs. Because the observations are generated by adding i.i.d Gaussian noise
with mean 0 and variance σ2 to the two payoffs for entry of each player, if G
is the underlying game and G1, ..., Gl are its perturbations,
1
σ2
d2(G
1, ..., Gl|G) (resp. 1
σ2
d2(G
1 − β1, ..., Gl − βl|G))
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follows a Chi-square distribution with 4l degrees of freedom in the partial
payoff information case (resp. in the payoff shifter case). We choose δ such that
P (d2(G
1, ..., Gl|G) ≤ δ) ≈ 0.99, and suppose the observer sees said value of δ.
While the observer does not have access to the distribution of perturbations,
it is extremely likely he will observe a magnitude of perturbations equal to
or less than δ, and we can use δ as a high-probability upper bound on the
information on the perturbations accessible to the observer.
(a) σ = 0.5,σs = 2.5 (b) σ = 0.5, σs = 5 (c) σ = 0.5, σs = 10 (d) σ = 1.5, σs = 10
Figure 7.1: Plots of the consistent region for different values of σ, σs in the
payoff shifter information observation model
In all plots, the colored region in the plots is the projection over the space
(γ1, θ1) for player 1 of the set of parameters (γ1, θ1, γ2, θ2) that are in the δ-
consistent region. The darker the region, the smaller the objective value of the
best explanation for the corresponding values of γ and θ. The black, center of
the region represents the value of (γ, θ) that minimizes d2(G
1, ..., Gl|G).
Figure 7.1 shows the evolution of the consistent region when varying σ and σs
in the payoff shifter information setting. The smaller the standard deviation
σ of the unknown noise, the tighter the consistent region. On the other hand,
reasonably increasing the value of σs can be beneficial, at least when it comes to
centering the consistent region on the true values of the parameters: this comes
from the fact that when the game is sufficiently perturbed, new equilibria
arise and new, informative behavior is observed, while not adding additional
uncertainty to the payoffs of the game.
Figure 7.2 shows the evolution of the consistent region when varying σ. The
larger the value of σ, the larger the consistent region, and the further away its
center is from the underlying, true value of the parameters.
Testing for linear properties
We also illustrate via simulation how our framework can the ability of linear
properties to explain observed behavior. In particular, here we test whether a
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(a) σ = 0.5 (b) σ = 1.0 (c) σ = 1.5 (d) σ = 2.5
Figure 7.2: Plots of the consistent region for different values of σ in the partial
payoff information observation model
(a) Payoff information setting with
σ = 0.5
(b) Payoff shifter information setting
with σ = 0.5, σs = 10
Figure 7.3: Testing for zero-sum with respect to the 1-norm
set of observations is likely to be explained by a zero-sum game. We consider
entry games as defined in the previous section, and assume the observer wants
to test whether observations were generated by a game that is approximately
zero-sum, without any information on the parametric form of the game (the
observer does not know the game is an entry game).
Formally, we say a game G = (G1, G2) is ε-zero-sum with respect to the p-
norm if and only if ‖G1 + G2‖p ≤ ε. Note that a game being ε-zero-sum is a
linear property and therefore can be included in our framework. The smaller
the value of ε, the more stringent the condition is and the closer G is to a
zero-sum game. We use l = 500, σ = 0.5, σs = 10 in all simulations.
As before, we pessimistically assume the observer sees δ such that
P (d2(G
1, ..., Gl|G) ≤ δ) ≈ 0.99, i.e. δ = 537.5 for l = 500, σ = 0.5. Figure 7.3
shows for which values of ε one can recover a ε-zero-sum game with objective
value less than 537.5 that explains the observations for different values of γ
and θ. Values of ε to the left of the intersection between the red and the blue
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line are impossible, while values to the right of this intersection indicate there
is a ε-zero-sum game that explain the observations. In both cases, we see that
no zero-sum game or game close to being zerosum is a good explanation for the
observations; in the payoff information setting, no game less than 21-zerosum
explains the observations, while in the payoff shifter setting, no game less than
15-zerosum explains the observations.
7.2 Multiplayer Cournot competition
In this section, we run simulations on a Cournot competition with varying
number of players. See Section 6.2 for a discussion of how our framework
can be modified to accomodate for Cournot games with many players and an
action set of infinite size for each player. All simulations are performed on a
laptop with a Intel Core i7-4700MQ at 2.40GHz and 16 Gb RAM.
Generating the games
Let n be the number of players, and qi the production level of player i. We fix
a parameter α = 0.05, and set the price function to be given by P (q1, ..., qn) =
1−α
n∑
i=1
qi; the price function is known to the observer. We fix the form of the
cost function to be linear, i.e. the cost of producing qi of goods incurred by
player i is given by ci(qi) = aiqi + bi. Without loss of generality, we set bi = 0:
bi does not affect the maximization problem nor the first order condition solved
by player i and hence the decision the chosen production level of the players.
We generate ng = 10 underlying Cournot games with heterogeneous, linear
cost functions ci(x) = aix as follows:
• We first set aˆi = 0.01 for every player i.
• We generate each of the ng games by adding i.i.d. truncated Gaussian
noise Xi with mean 0 and standard deviation 0.01 to the aˆi’s. I.e.,
ai = 0.01 +Xi where Xi can be written as Xi = max(Zi,−0.01) and Zi
is a non-truncated Gaussian with mean 0, standard deviation 0.01. This
ensures the ai’s are always non-negative, hence the production costs are
always non-decreasing.
Note that the same ng games are used in all plots and simulations.
For each of the ng games, we then generate l perturbed games by adding
truncated Gaussian noise with standard deviation σ = 0.001 to each of the
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ai’s. As before, the noise is truncated to ensure non-negativity of the perturbed
ai’s. We then solve the first-order condition to obtain equilibrium observations
and note that all obtained qi’s are positive with extremely high probability.
Observer’s problem and simulation results
We assume the observer wants to recover a cost that is polynomial of chosen
degree d ≥ 1. I.e., the observer parameterizes the cost functions in the fol-
lowing way: ci(x) = ai(d)x
d + ai(d − 1)xd−1 + ... + ai(1)x; we always assume
that for every player i, every perturbed game k, ai(0) = 0 and a
k
i (0) = 0 for
simplicity (not producing anything costs the players nothing); we note that
this without loss of generality, as a constant shift does not change the utility-
maximizing strategies of the players. The observer also knows the perturbed
cost function cki ’s of the perturbed games are convex. The program then solved
by the observer is derived from the results of Section 6.2. In the whole sec-
tion, all results are averaged over the ng games originally generated: i.e., for
each game, we measure the diameter of the consistent set, the time taken to
recover a game within the set, and the time taken to compute the diameter,
then average it over the ng games we are considering.
Figure 7.4 shows the time it takes the observer to recover a game within the
consistent set as a function of the degree, fixing the number of players to
10 and the number of perturbed games/equilibrium observations to 50 per
underlying game. We see the recovery time is less than a minute, even when
considering polynomials of degree 10 or 12, and that said time evolves roughly
linearly in the degree of the polynomial used for recovery. This allows for
recovery within minutes for high degree polynomials even when using minimal
computing power. Recovery could be done even faster using the amount of
computing resources available to universities and industries instead of using a
personal laptop.
Figure 7.5 shows the value of the diameter of the consistent set when the
observer assumes the cost function is linear. The diameter is plotted as a
function of the number of observations, in the presence of a fixed number (10)
of players. The figure shows the diameter decreases quickly as the number of
equilibrium observations. When only one equilibrium observation is available,
the diameter is given by 3.3 × 10−3, which is 35% of the expeted true cost
aˆi = 0.01; at 10 equilibrium observations, the cost is 3.3 × 10−4, i.e. only
40
Figure 7.4: Average recovery time as a function of the degree with 10 players,
10 equilibrium observations
Figure 7.5: Average diameter as a function of the number equilibrium obser-
vations
3.5% of aˆi, and at 100 equilibrium observations, it is 6.6 × 10−5, i.e. 0.66%
of aˆi. Hence, very few equilibrium observations are necessary to recover the
underlying game accurately.
Figures 7.6a and 7.6b show the time it takes the observer to recover a game
within the consistent set and to compute its diameter as a function of the
number of players, fixing the degree of the polynomial to 1 and equilibrium
observations to 50 per underlying game. Similarly to before, we see that the
recovery evolves linearly as a function of the number of players, and it takes
less than 1.5 seconds in average to recover a consistent games even with 50
players! The diameter time increases roughly quadratically: this was expected,
as both the number of programs to solve and the size of each program evolve
linearly in the number of players. Hence, while computing the diameter scales
superlinearly, it remains computable within minutes even with larger numbers
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of players on a personal laptop. To the best of our knowledge, no previous
work offers comparable amounts of scalability.
Finally, Figures 7.6c and 7.6d show the time it takes the observer to recover a
game within the consistent set and to compute its diameter as a function of the
number of equilibria, fixing the degree of the polynomial to 1 and the number
of players to 10 per underlying game. Both the recovery time and the diameter
time scale linearly with the number of equilibrium observations. Unlike before,
while the size of each subprogram to solve to compute the diameter increases,
the number of such programs is independent of the number of observations,
allowing for extremely good scalability of our framework as function of the
number of equilibrium observations! In practice, the number of players is
fixed but the observer may sees more and more observations over time, and
our framework is able to deal with such an increasing number of observations.
(a) Recovery time
vs players
(b) Diameter time
vs players
(c) Recovery time
vs equilibria
(d) Diameter time
vs equilibria
Figure 7.6: Average recovery/diameter time as a function of the number of
observations/number of players, when recovering linear costs
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A p p e n d i x A
PROOF OF PERFORMANCE OF THE ALGORITHM
Consider the following optimization program:
Pδ = sup
G˜,Gˆ,γ
γ
s.t. G˜ ∈ Sd(δ)
Gˆ ∈ Sd(δ)
max(‖G˜1 − Gˆ1‖∞, ‖G˜2 − Gˆ2‖∞) ≥ γ
Clearly, Pδ = D(Sd(δ)), simply by noting that the program is a rewriting
of Definition 5. Now if Pδ = max
(i,j)∈m1m2
max(Pδ,1(i, j), Pδ,2(i, j)), then we have
shown that A(δ) = D(Sd(δ)). Clearly, this holds because:
• For every player p and action profile (i, j), if G˜p(i, j)− Gˆp(i, j) ≥ γ then
max(‖G˜1 − Gˆ1‖∞, ‖G˜2 − Gˆ2‖∞) ≥ γ. Hence Pδ ≥ max
p,(i,j)
Pδ,p(i, j).
• If max(‖G˜1− Gˆ1‖∞, ‖G˜2− Gˆ2‖∞) ≥ γ, then there exists a player p and a
set of actions (i, j) such that G˜p(i, j)− Gˆp(i, j) ≥ γ w.l.o.g. (remember
G˜ and Gˆ play symmetric roles) and so one of the Pδ,p(i, j) needs to have
objective value at least γ. This means that Pδ ≤ max
p,(i,j)
Pδ,p(i, j).
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A p p e n d i x B
PROOF OF RECOVERY LEMMA UNDER INFINITE NORM
AND PAYOFF INFORMATION
Proof. For simplicity of notation, we drop the indices p. We first remark that
(G,G1, ..., Gl) is feasible for Program (4.1); as (Gˆ, Gˆ1, ..., Gˆl) is optimal, it is
necessarily the case that
max
k
‖Gˆ− Gˆk‖∞ ≤ max
k
‖G−Gk‖∞ ≤ δ.
Let us write ∆G = G− Gˆ. We know that for all k, ek ′Gk = ek ′Gˆk = vk, and
thus ek ′(Gk − Gˆk) = 0. We can write
E∆G = (e′1(G− Gˆ) ... e′l(G− Gˆ))′
= (e′1(G−G1 +G1 − Gˆ1 + Gˆ1 − Gˆ) ... e′l(G−Gl +Gl − Gˆl + Gˆl − Gˆ))′
= (e′1(G−G1 + Gˆ1 − Gˆ) ... e′l(G−Gl + Gˆl − Gˆ))′.
Let xk = G−Gk + Gˆk − Gˆ. We then have ‖E∆G‖∞ ≤ max
k
‖xk‖∞ as ek has
only elements between 0 and 1. Therefore, by the triangle inequality,
‖E∆G‖∞ ≤ 2δ.
It immediately follows that ‖∆G‖∞ ≤ 2‖E−1‖∞ · δ.
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A p p e n d i x C
WRITING COURNOT CONSTRAINTS EFFICIENTLY
C.1 Casting the equilibrium constraints as linear constraints
When action profile (q1, ..., qn) is chosen, player i gets utility ui(qi, q−i) =
qiP (q1, ..., qn)−ci(qi) where q−i denotes the production levels of all players but
i. A pure action profile q∗ = (q∗1, ..., q
∗
n) is a Nash Equilibrium if and only if
for all players i, qi∗ maximizes ui(qi, q∗−i); as P is concave and ci is convex, ui
is convex in qi and the equilibrium condition is equivalent to the first order
condition
qi
∂P
∂qi
(q1, ..., qn) + P (q1, ..., qn) = c
′
i(qi) ∀i (C.1)
Then, combining Equations C.1 and 6.1, the equilibrium constraints become
qi
∂P
∂qi
(q1, ..., qn) + P (q1, ..., qn) =
d∑
k=1
kai(k)q
k−1
i (C.2)
which are linear and tractable in the variables (ai(0), ai(1), ..., ai(d))), as long
as P (q1, ..., qn),
∂P
∂qi
(q1, ..., qn) can be efficiently computed given observations
q1, ..., qn. Such equilibrium constraints can be incorporated into our frame-
work.
C.2 Casting the convexity constraints as SDP constraints
We need to be able to deal with“ci is convex polynomial of degree d” con-
straints for all i in a computationally efficient manner. This constraint can be
rewritten as “c′′i is a non-negative polynomial of degree d ”. Fortunately, this
is a classic constraint in the realm of convex optimization, and can be dealt
with in the following ways:
• If d = 1, ci(qi) = ai(1)qi + ai(0) (c′′i = 0) is always convex. In this case,
no constraint need be added.
• If d ≥ 2, we need to ensure that c′′i is non-negative in all points. It
is known that a univariate polynomial is non-negative if and only if it
can be written as a sum-of-squares; such constraints can efficiently be
transformed into tractable semidefinite constraints – for more details on
the SDP formulation of sum-of-squares constraints, refer to [26].
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A p p e n d i x D
OBTAINING THE DUAL PROGRAM
We have
L(Gk, G, λkii′ , λ0, λ1, µ)
= d2(G
1, ..., Gk|G) +
∑
k,i,i′
λkii′ e˜
k ′
ii′G
k + µ(−
∑
k,i,i′
e˜k ′ii′G
k − ε) + λ′1(G− 1)− λ′0G
= d2(G
1, ..., Gk|G) +
∑
k,i,i′
(λkii′ − µ)e˜k ′ii′Gk + (λ1 − λ0)′G− µε− 1′λ1
= d2(G
1, ..., Gk|G) +
∑
k,i,i′
µkii′ e˜
k ′
ii′G
k + (λ1 − λ0)′G− µε− 1′λ1
with
µkii′ + µ = λ
k
ii′ (D.1)
Our goal is to find h(λkii′ , λ0, λ1, µ, µ
k
ii′) = inf
G,Gk
L(Gk, G, λ0, λ1, µ, µ
k
ii′) in order
to write the dual. Since L is a convex function of G1, ..., Gl, G, the first order
condition needs to hold at a minimum in G1, ..., Gl, G, unless this minimum is
−∞. Remark that for all k,
∂L
∂Gk
(Gk, G, λ0, λ1, µ, µ
k
ii′) = 2(G
k −G) +
∑
i,i′
µkii′ e˜
k
ii′
and
∂L
∂G
(Gk, G, λ0, λ1, µ, µ
k
ii′) = 2
l∑
k=1
(G−Gk) + (λ1 − λ0)
Therefore, the first order condition is given by
2(Gk −G) +
∑
i,i′
µkii′ e˜
k
ii′ = 0 ∀k
2
l∑
j=1
(G−Gj) + (λ1 − λ0) = 0
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that can be rewritten
Gk = G− 1
2
(
∑
i,i′
µkii′ e˜
k
ii′) ∀k (D.2)
G =
1
l
l∑
j=1
Gj − 1
2l
(λ1 − λ0) (D.3)
and implies the following system of equalities that must hold whenever the
first order condition is satisfied:
Gk =
1
l − 1
l∑
j 6=k
Gj − l
2(l − 1)(
λ1 − λ0
l
+
∑
i,i′
µkii′ e˜
k
ii′) ∀k (D.4)
G =
1
l
l∑
j=1
Gj − 1
2l
(λ1 − λ0) (D.5)
The system has a solution if and only if the system of equations in (D.4) has
a solution. Let us write x(i, j) = (G1(i, j), ..., Gl(i, j))′, bk = − l
2(l−1)(
λ1−λ0
l
+∑
i,i′
µkii′ e˜
k
ii′) for all k, b(i, j) = (b
1(i, j), ..., bl(i, j)), and A ∈ Rl×l the matrix that
has 1’s on the diagonal and − 1
l−1 for every other coefficient. Furthermore,
let R(A) denote the range of A, and N (A) its nullspace. Then there exists a
solution to (D.4) iff there exists a solution to Ax(i, j) = b(i, j) for all (i, j), i.e.,
if and only if b(i, j) ∈ R(A) for all (i, j). The following statements characterize
R(A) and N (A).
Claim 5. rank(A) = l − 1, dimN (A) = 1
Proof. Let us write A = (a1, a2, ..., al) where ak ∈ Rl has 1 as a kth coordinate
and has − 1
l−1 for all other coordinates. Therefore, for all i,
l∑
k=1
ak(i) = 1−
l∑
k 6=i
1
l − 1 = 0,
so
l∑
k=1
ak = 0 and, necessarily, rank(A) ≤ l − 1. Now rank(A) ≥ l − 1 be-
cause (−1, 0, .., 0, 1)′, (−1, 0, ..., 0, 1, 0)′, (−1, 0, ..., 0, 1, 0, 0)′,..., (−1, 1, 0, ..., 0)′
are l − 1 linearly independent vectors that are in the range of A, as they are
eigenvectors for eigenvalue k
k−1 . dimN (A) = 1 follows from the rank-nullity
theorem.
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Claim 6. R(A) = {x ∈ Rl/
l∑
k=1
xk = 0}
Proof. Let x ∈ R(A), x = Ay. WriteA = (a1, ..., al)′, then x = (a′1y, a′2y, ..., a′ly)′,
so
l∑
k=1
xk = (
l∑
k=1
ak)
′y = 0′y = 0. Therefore, R(A) ⊆ {x ∈ Rl/
l∑
k=1
xk = 0}.
The rest follows from {x ∈ Rl/
l∑
k=1
xk = 0} being a linear subspace of R(A)
that has dimension l − 1.
Corollary 1. There exists a solution to the first order conditions if and only
if
l∑
k=1
bl = − l
2(l − 1)
l∑
k=1
(
λ1 − λ0
l
+
∑
i,i′
µkii′ e˜
k
ii′) = 0 (D.6)
Proof. Follows immediately from claim 6.
Claim 7. N (A) = span(1, ..., 1)′
Proof. A(1, ..., 1)′ = 0 so span(1, ..., 1)′ ⊆ N (A) and dim span(1, ..., 1)′ =
dimN (A) = 1.
Corollary 2. If equation (D.6) holds, the set of solutions S(i, j) of Ax(i, j) =
b(i, j) is given by
S(i, j) = {(αij + G˜1(i, j), ..., αij + G˜l(i, j))′/αij ∈ R}
for any (G˜1, ..., G˜l) that satisfies the first order conditions. In particular, the
set of solutions S to the first order conditions is given by
S = {(M + G˜1, ...,M + G˜l)/M ∈ Rl×l}
for any (G˜1, ..., G˜l) that satisfies the first order conditions.
Claim 8. ∀k, let G˜k = l−1
l
bk. Then (G˜1, ..., G˜l) satisfy the first order condi-
tions.
Proof. Take any k, 1
l−1
∑
j 6=k
Gj+bk = 1
l−1 · l−1l
∑
j 6=k
bj+bk = −1
l
bk+bk = l−1
l
bk = Gl
as
∑
j 6=k
bj = −bk from equation D.6.
Putting it all together, we obtain the following lemma:
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Lemma 5. The first order conditions are satisfied if and only if
− l
2(l − 1)
l∑
k=1
(
λ1 − λ0
l
+
∑
i,i′
µkii′ e˜
k
ii′) = 0
in which case the set S of (G1, ..., Gl) satisfying the first order conditions is
given by
S = {(M − 1
2
(
λ1 − λ0
l
+
∑
i,i′
µ1ii′ e˜
1
ii′), ...,M +
1
2
(
λ1 − λ0
l
+
∑
i,i′
µlii′ e˜
l
ii′)/M ∈ Rl×l}
We now have, when constraints (D.1) and (D.6) are satisfied, and recalling
that equation (D.2) must hold, that
h(µkii′ , λ
k
ii′ , λ0, λ1)
=
1
4
l∑
k=1
(
∑
i,i′
µkii′ e˜
k
ii′)
′(
∑
i,i′
µkii′ e˜
k
ii′) +
∑
k,i,i′
µkii′ e˜
k ′
ii′ (G−
1
2
∑
i,i′
µkii′ e˜
k
ii′)
+ (λ1 − λ0)′G− 1′λ1 − µε
=
1
4
l∑
k=1
(
∑
i,i′
µkii′ e˜
k
ii′)
′(
∑
i,i′
µkii′ e˜
k
ii′) +
∑
k,i,i′
µkii′ e˜
k ′
ii′ (−
1
2
∑
i,i′
µkii′ e˜
k
ii′)− 1′λ1 − µε
= −1
4
l∑
k=1
(
∑
i,i′
µkii′ e˜
k
ii′)
′(
∑
i,i′
µkii′ e˜
k
ii′)− 1′λ1 − µε
and otherwise, h(µkii′ , λ
k
ii′ , λ0, λ1) = −∞. Recall λkii′ , λ0, λ1 ≥ 0 ∀k, i, i′, and
get the following dual:
(D) = max
µk
ii′ ,λ0,λ1
−1
4
∑l
k=1(
∑
i,i′
µkii′ e˜
k
ii′)
′(
∑
i,i′
µkii′ e˜
k
ii′)− 1′λ1 − µε
s.t. λ1 − λ0 +
∑
k,i,i′
µkii′ e˜
k
ii′ = 0
µ+ µkii′ = λ
k
ii′
λkii′ , λ0, λ1 ≥ 0
This can further be rewritten as:
(D) = max
µk
ii′ ,λ0,λ1
−1
4
∑l
k=1(
∑
i,i′
µkii′ e˜
k
ii′)
′(
∑
i,i′
µkii′ e˜
k
ii′)− 1′λ1 − µε
s.t. λ1 − λ0 +
∑
k,i,i′
µkii′ e˜
k
ii′ = 0
µ+ µkii′ ≥ 0
λ0, λ1 ≥ 0
52
A p p e n d i x E
PROOF OF THE DEGENERACY-ACCURACY TRADE-OFF
Claim 9. P (ε) is a non-decreasing function of ε. In particular, if ε2 > ε1 ≥ 0,
then
ε21
ε22
P (ε2) ≥ P (ε1).
Proof. Since ε1
ε2
≤ 1, we have 0 ≤ ε1
ε2
G ≤ 1. Therefore, one can take an
optimal solution of P (ε2) and multiply all variables by
ε1
ε2
, to get a solution
that is feasible for P (ε1); this solution has objective (
ε1
ε2
)2P (ε2).
This immediately gives the first part of the theorem.
Lemma 6. Let ε2 ≥ ε1 > 0, and suppose P (ε2) > 0. Then:
P (ε1) ≥ (1− 2ε2 − ε1
ε2
)P (ε2)−
√
lm
ε2 − ε1
ε2
√
P (ε2)
Proof. Recall that
D(ε) = max
µk
ii′ ,λ0,λ1
−1
4
∑l
k=1(
∑
i,i′
µkii′ e˜
k
ii′)
′(
∑
i,i′
µkii′ e˜
k
ii′)− 1′λ1 − µε
s.t. λ1 − λ0 +
∑
k,i,i′
µkii′ e˜
k
ii′ = 0
µ+ µkii′ ≥ 0
λ0, λ1 ≥ 0
(E.1)
Take any optimal solution (µkii′ , µ, λ1) of D(ε2), it is feasible for D(ε1) as the
constraints in the dual do not depend on the value of ε. Therefore,
−1
4
l∑
k=1
(
∑
i,i′
µkii′ e˜
k
ii′)
′(
∑
i,i′
µkii′ e˜
k
ii′)− 1′λ1 − µε1 ≤ D(ε1)
Note that since strong duality holds, by the KKT conditions,
1
4
l∑
k=1
(
∑
i,i′
µkii′ e˜
k
ii′)
′(
∑
i,i′
µkii′ e˜
k
ii′) = P (ε2) = D(ε2)
and therefore
−D(ε2)− 1′λ1 − µε1 ≤ D(ε1)
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Since
D(ε2) = −1
4
l∑
k=1
(
∑
i,i′
µkii′ e˜
k
ii′)
′(
∑
i,i′
µkii′ e˜
k
ii′)− 1′λ1 − µε2 = −D(ε2)− 1′λ1 − µε2
we have
2D(ε2) + µε2 = −1′λ1
and therefore,
D(ε2) + µ(ε2 − ε1) = −D(ε2)− 1′λ1 − µε1 ≤ D(ε1)
Now, let us try to lower bound µ. We first remark that necessarily, µ ≤ 0. If
not,
D(ε2) = −1
4
l∑
k=1
(
∑
i,i′
µkii′ e˜
k
ii′)
′(
∑
i,i′
µkii′ e˜
k
ii′)− 1′λ1 − µε < 0
and strong duality cannot hold as P (ε2) ≥ 0. Since
µ =
1
ε2
(−2D(ε2)− 1′λ1)
it is enough to upper-bound 1′λ1. Note that since λ1 is always chosen to be as
small as possible as a function of the µkii′ in order to minimize the objective,
we have the following coordinate by coordinate inequality:
λ1 = max(0,
∑
k,i,i′
µkii′ e˜
k
ii′) ≤ |
∑
k,i,i′
µkii′ e˜
k
ii′ | ≤
∑
k
|
∑
i,i′
µkii′ e˜
k
ii′ |
by the triangle inequality. For simplicity, let us denote Xk = |
∑
i,i′
µkii′ e˜
k
ii′ |.
l∑
k=1
|
∑
i,i′
µkii′ e˜
k
ii′ |′|
∑
i,i′
µkii′ e˜
k
ii′| =
l∑
k=1
(
∑
i,i′
µkii′ e˜
k
ii′)
′(
∑
i,i′
µkii′ e˜
k
ii′) =
l∑
k=1
X ′kXk = 4D(ε2)
An upper bound on 1′λ1 ≤
∑
k
1
′Xk is therefore given by
max
Xk
∑
k
1
′Xk
s.t.
∑l
k=1X
′
kXk ≤ 4D(ε2)
We can find an exact solution to this convex optimization problem by looking
at its dual (Slater and therefore strong duality hold); the Lagrangian is given
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by L(Xk, λ) =
∑
k
1
′Xk − λ
∑l
k=1X
′
kXk + 4λD(ε2) with λ ≥ 0 and the first
order condition is Xk =
1
2λ
1. Therefore,
h(λ) = inf
Xk
L(Xk, λ) =
1
4λ
l∑
k=1
1
′
1 + 4λD(ε2)
and the dual is given by
min
λ
∑
k
1
4λ
∑l
k=1 1
′
1 + 4λD(ε2)
s.t. λ ≥ 0
The solution to the dual is λ∗ =
√∑l
k=1 1
′1
16D(ε2)
≥ 0 by the first order condition,
as P (ε2) = D(ε2) > 0 and we get
h(λ∗) =
√√√√ l∑
k=1
1′1
√
D(ε2) ≤
√
lm2
√
D(ε2) =
√
lm
√
D(ε2).
So, 0 ≤ 1′λ1 ≤
√
lm
√
D(ε2) leading to
µ =
1
ε2
(−2D(ε2)− 1′λ1) ≥ 1
ε2
(−2D(ε2)−
√
lm
√
D(ε2))
and therefore, as ε2 − ε1 ≥ 0,
(1− 2ε2 − ε1
ε2
)D(ε2)−
√
lm
ε2 − ε1
ε2
√
D(ε2) ≤ D(ε2) + µ(ε2 − ε1) ≤ D(ε1)
Claim 10. ∀ε ≥ ε∗,
lim
h→0+
P (ε+ h) = P (ε)
i.e. P (.) is right-continuous on [ε∗,+∞[.
Proof. Take h > 0. P (ε + h) ≥ ( ε+h
ε
)2P (ε) from claim 9, and ( ε+h
ε
)2P (ε) →
P (ε) when h tends to 0. From Lemma 6, since P (ε+ h) > 0 as ε+ h > ε∗, we
have
P (ε) ≥ (1− 2 h
ε+ h
)P (ε+ h)−
√
lm
h
ε+ h
√
P (ε+ h)
and so
1
1− 2 h
ε+h
(P (ε) +
√
lm
h
ε+ h
√
P (ε+ h)) ≥ P (ε+ h)
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Note that P (ε+ h) ≤ P (ε+ α) for any constant α and small enough h; fix an
α, we have for h small that
1
1− 2 h
ε+h
(P (ε) +
√
lm
h
ε+ h
√
P (ε+ α)) ≥ P (ε+ h)
As P (ε + α) is finite (by the linear program and previous calculations), we
have 1
1−2 h
ε+h
(P (ε) +
√
lm h
ε+h
√
P (ε+ α))→ P (ε) when h tends to 0.
Claim 11. ∀ε > ε∗,
lim
h→0−
P (ε+ h) = P (ε)
i.e. P (.) is left-continuous on ]ε∗,+∞[.
Proof. The proof is similar to the right-continuity one. The main difference
comes from the fact that we know require P (ε) > 0 to satisfy the condition of
lemma 6 (as ε > ε+ h hor h < 0), so we cannot include the ε = ε∗ case.
Claim 12. P(.) is continuous on [0,+∞[.
Proof. By claims 10 and 11, P(.) is continuous on [0, ε∗[ and ]ε∗,+∞[. We
just need to check that P (.) is continuous at ε∗; it is right-continuous at
ε∗ by claim 10, and the left-continuity follows from the fact that P (ε) = 0
∀ε ≤ ε∗.
Claim 13. P(.) is convex on [0,+∞[.
Proof. Let S(ε) be the feasible region of optimization program (5.1). It is easy
to see that the objective function of (5.1) is convex, and that the mapping
ε → S(ε) is convex according to the definition of [19]. Therefore, as seen
in [19], the optimal value function P (.) of Program (5.1) is convex.
Claim 14. Let ε ≥ ε∗, we have for all h > 0
h+ 2ε
ε2
P (ε) ≤ P (ε+ h)− P (ε)
h
≤ 2
ε+ h
P (ε+ h) +
√
lm
1
ε+ h
√
P (ε+ h)
Proof. From claim 9, for h > 0,
P (ε+ h)− P (ε)
h
≥ P (ε)
h
((
ε+ h
ε
)2 − 1) = h+ 2ε
ε2
P (ε) (E.2)
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From Lemma 6,
P (ε+ h)− P (ε)
h
≤ 1
h
(2
h
ε+ h
P (ε+ h) +
√
lm
h
ε+ h
√
P (ε+ h))
=
2
ε+ h
P (ε+ h) +
√
lm
1
ε+ h
√
P (ε+ h).
Since P (.) is a convex and continuous on [0,+∞[, its right derivative dP (ε)
dε
exists at every point ε ≥ 0. By Claim 14, we have
l(ε) ≤ dP (ε)
dε
≤ L(ε)
where
l(ε) = lim
h=0+
h+ 2ε
ε2
P (ε)
L(ε) = lim
h=0+
2
ε+ h
P (ε+ h) +
√
lm
1
ε+ h
√
P (ε+ h)
if they exist. We know that l(ε) = 2
ε
P (ε) exists; L(ε) = 2
ε
P (ε) +
√
lm
ε
√
P (ε)
exists because by claim 10, P (.) is right continuous and limh=0+ P (ε+ h) = ε.
This implies that given an initial condition P (ε0) for some ε0 > ε
∗, P (.) lies
between the function f with f(ε0) = P (ε0) and
df(ε)
dε
= l(ε) and the function
g with g(ε0) = P (ε0) and
dg(ε)
dε
= L(ε) for all ε ≥ ε0. We can find f and g by
solving differential equations
df(ε)
dε
=
2
ε
f(ε) (E.3)
dg(ε)
dε
=
2
ε
g(ε) +
√
lm
ε
√
g(ε) (E.4)
for all ε ≥ ε0. It is easy to see that with initial condition f(ε0) = P (ε0),
ODE (E.3) has as a unique solution
f(ε) = P (ε0)
ε2
ε20
To solve ODE (E.4), let us write g(ε) =
√
f(ε), and note that the differential
equation can be rewritten:
2g(ε)
dg(ε)
dε
=
2
ε
g(ε)2 +
√
lm
ε
g(ε)
57
Noting that by the choice of initial condition, g(ε0) = P (ε0) > 0 and that the
solution of the differential equation is necessarily increasing as the derivative is
always non-negative, we have g(ε) > 0 for all ε ≥ ε0. Therefore, on [ε0,+∞[,
dg(ε)
dε
=
1
ε
g(ε) +
√
lm
ε
The initial condition being fixed, this differential equation has a unique solu-
tion. Note that solutions to the homogeneous ODE dg(ε)
dε
= 1
ε
g(ε) are of the
form g(ε) = Cε, and that g0(ε) = −
√
lm
2
is a particular solution of the ODE.
Therefore, given the initial condition g(ε0) =
√
P (ε0), we have
g(ε) = (
√
P (ε0) +
√
lm
2
)
ε
ε0
−
√
lm
2
and thus
f(ε) =
(
(
√
P (ε0) +
√
lm
2
)
ε
ε0
−
√
lm
2
)2
.
